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Throwing Out the Ballast: Growth Models and the Liberalization of German Industrial 
Relations 
Abstract  
This article proposes a new interpretation of the evolution of German industrial relations focusing on 
the interaction between macroeconomic dynamics and industrial relations developments and 
specifically on ‘growth models’. It argues there has been a shift in the German growth model from 
growth pulled by net exports and consumption simultaneously to almost exclusively export-led 
growth. In addition, exports of machinery and transportation equipment have become more price-
sensitive, implying that wage and price increases now pose a greater threat to growth than in the past. 
These macroeconomic developments have spurred a set of adjustments in the industrial relations 
sphere with export-oriented firms seeking cost reductions and liberalizations. Industrial relations 
changes have in turn contributed to entrench export-led growth by augmenting the systemic 
importance of the foreign sector and reducing the relevance of domestic demand. The export-sector 
has thrived at the expense of real wage stagnation, particularly (but not exclusively) in labour intensive 
service sectors, and pattern bargaining has lost its ability to redistribute across sectors and boost 
domestic demand. The new German model is much leaner and meaner than in the past. Contrary to 
recent literature, its erosion and liberalization are not limited to the service periphery but affect the 
manufacturing core as well. 
SER keywords: Germany, industrial relations, institutional change, varieties of capitalism, growth 
models  
JEL keywords: P16 Political economy; E02 Institutions and the macroeconomy; J52 Collective 
bargaining 
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1. Introduction 
This article contributes to the debate on the transformation of the German industrial relations 
system, and more broadly on institutional change in advanced capitalism, by focusing on the 
interaction between macroeconomic dynamics, specifically the nature and evolution of ‘growth 
models’, and developments in the industrial relations sphere (see Omitted reference). 
Existing scholarship on the evolution of German industrial relations falls broadly in two 
camps. Scholars in the Varieties of Capitalism (VofC) school have traditionally highlighted the 
resilience of German coordinated institutions (Hall and Soskice, 2001a), while their critics have 
emphasized the erosion of the same institutions and the fundamental liberalization of the system 
(Streeck, 2009; Baccaro and Howell, 2011). Recently the two perspectives have come closer to one 
another. New literature in the VofC tradition has acknowledged the liberalization trend but has insisted 
that it only affects the service sector while the manufacturing sector remains immune from it (Palier 
and Thelen, 2010; Hassel, 2014). Although both perspectives capture important elements, they are 
both limited by their exclusive focus on supply-side institutions. 
In this paper we situate industrial relations developments within the broad transformation of 
the German growth model. Borrowing freely from New Kaleckian macroeconomics, we argue that 
supply-side institutions and macroeconomic developments stand in a relationship of ‘co-evolution’ to 
one another. This implies that to truly understand the changes undergone by the German model in the 
last twenty years one needs to consider macroeconomic developments as well. Specifically, we 
contend that the German economy has shifted from a model of growth simultaneously led by net 
exports and household consumption, to an almost exclusively export-led model. Furthermore, exports 
seem to have become significantly more price sensitive than in the past in the broad machinery and 
transport equipment sector, accounting for almost 50 percent of total exports. These trends have 
spurred meso- and micro-level initiatives by export-oriented firms to reduce costs and regain price 
competitiveness, leading to withdrawal from sectoral collective bargaining, opening clauses and actual 
or threatened outsourcing. In turn, the weakening of collective bargaining institutions has led to 
stagnating wage growth both overall and specifically in the lower half of the wage distribution. These 
distributional dynamics have weakened the ability of household consumption to act as growth engine, 
reinforcing the systemic importance of exports and the unbalanced nature of the growth model.  
Some of the conclusions we draw from the analysis of the growth model and associated 
institutional changes are similar to those of recent VofC scholarship. For example, we too find that 
there is an emerging dualism between the manufacturing sector and the low-end service sector. 
However, we identify very different causal mechanisms for the observed changes, since our argument 
emphasizes the price competitiveness of exports and the associated restructuring initiatives by export-
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oriented firms as crucial variables. Furthermore, we come to very different conclusions with regard to 
the stability of the system and its future viability. Our analysis suggests that the ‘problem’ of the 
German political economy is not just that it is export-led but that there is a trade-off between export 
growth and consumption growth. The price sensitivity of exports means that the economy ‘needs’ a 
competitive real exchange rate to grow, and this puts constant pressure on the wage bargaining system 
to keep wage growth in check, and even to produce slower wage growth than trade competitors 
(controlling for productivity), in order to boost price competitiveness in a single currency regime. So 
far, core manufacturing workers have largely managed to avoid the resulting wage repression, unlike 
low-end service sector workers for whom wage growth has been non-existent. But there is some 
evidence of decoupling between wages and productivity even in the manufacturing sector. 
Furthermore, the spread of atypical work in manufacturing and the substitutability of permanent and 
temporary workers lead to further downward pressure on wage and working conditions. In brief, the 
new German model emerges from our analysis looking much less a stable ‘equilibrium’ than in old 
and new VofC analyses. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the literature on 
the transformation of the German model. Next the notion of growth models is introduced, and 
descriptive evidence is provided to make the point that a shift has occurred in Germany. The fourth 
section performs an econometric analysis of the price sensitivity of German exports. The fifth section 
contains an historical reconstruction of the processes by which the industrial relations actors 
responded to the need to cut costs and gain flexibility, both at the enterprise and at the national level. 
The sixth section discusses the basic features of the new German model and whether there is any 
evidence of the emergence of a new political economic ‘equilibrium’. The concluding section pulls the 
various threads together. 
 
2. Theoretical Perspectives on the German Model: ‘Liberalizers’ vs. ‘Coordinationists’ 
Germany is an important case for the comparative political economy and industrial relations 
literatures. As the prototypical coordinated market economy (CME), it is, or perhaps one should say 
that it was, living proof that a more ‘worker-friendly’ alternative to liberal capitalism not only exists 
but is even economically successful. In a seminal article, Wolfgang Streeck linked the peculiar 
features of the German system to a particular production regime, which he called ‘Diversified Quality 
Production’ (DQP) (Streeck, 1991). 
Streeck’s argument was that the high costs generated by industry-level collective bargaining 
and other institutional rigidities made it very difficult for German firms to compete on wage costs, and 
forced them to reorient their production strategies towards market niches where quality and 
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customization were crucial for manufacturing success. Simultaneously, the vocational training system 
ensured an adequate supply, and even an overabundance of skilled workers, which could thus easily 
adapt to new technologies and innovative work practices (Streeck, 1991). In turn, high employment 
protection created incentives for both employers and employees to invest in specific skills, while 
encompassing sectoral agreements and cohesive employer organizations limited the risk of low-wage 
competition and of skill poaching (Estevez-Abe et al., 2001). Finally, plant-level codetermination 
fostered labour-management cooperation at workplace level (Müller-Jentsch, 1995).  
The DQP model was conceived to be the outcome of a set of institutional constraints to which 
firms had progressively and sometimes reluctantly adapted (Streeck, 1997a). It had developed 
piecemeal, often as the result of unintended consequences and of favourable environmental 
circumstances, and in Streeck’s original argument it could be easily undone if the latter changed 
(Streeck, 2009). In particular, if international markets became more price-competitive, or if the 
emergence of a domestic low-wage sector reduced the incentives for firms to invest in skills and 
innovation, the DQP system could, it was argued, easily lose its lustre (Streeck 1997a).  
It is unclear to what extent the stylized ‘German model’ laid out above has really ever existed 
but it is now commonly accepted that it has undergone a great deal of change in the past 20 years. 
(e.g., Hassel and Streeck 2004, Streeck and Thelen 2005, Doellgast 2009). However, the extent and 
significance of change and the mechanisms driving it are still subject to heated debate. In what follows 
we distinguish between two schools of thought, which we call ‘coordinationists’ and ‘liberalizers’. 
Some authors sit uneasily in either camp (e.g. Herrigel, 2015), but this bipartition helps us to 
summarize the debate. 
2.1 The coordinationists 
The coordinationist position is held by scholars linked to the Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) 
school. This school readily accepted the DQP argument summarized above, but sought to embed it 
within a more rationalist framework and to provide it with microfoundations (Hall and Soskice, 
2001b). Thus the German coordinated model was conceptualized as an institutional equilibrium, i.e. as 
the outcome of the rational strategies of key actors, particularly export-oriented firms.  
In David Soskice’s seminal analysis (Soskice, 1999), the German model was supported by the 
pre-strategic preferences of German employers. According to the argument, German employers were 
aware that their competitive advantage hinged on coordinated institutions and thus were willing to 
shore up the system independently of the unions’ countervailing power (Soskice, 1999, p.134). This 
gave the German model a remarkable degree of stability even under conditions of increased economic 
integration, and set it on a radically different path from economies such as Britain or the US, which 
were expected to liberalize due to the absence of firms’ capacities for strategic coordination.  
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While also writing from a VoC perspective, Kathleen Thelen always had a more political view 
of the German model (e.g. Thelen, 2001). For example, she saw the preferences of German employers 
as strategic rather than pre-strategic, and argued that the resulting institutional equilibrium depended 
on the balance of power between social actors as well. In other words, employers would presumably 
withdraw their support for non-market coordination if labour lost its ability to pose a credible threat 
(Thelen, 2001, p.101). However, Thelen considered a loss of union power an unlikely event since she 
saw globalization as strengthening the power resources of labour at least in the German DQP regime, 
where manufacturing performance depended on close coordination of production stages (Thelen, 
2001; Thelen and Wijnbergen, 2003).  
Subsequent analyses have emphasized that, beyond the surface of stability, German capitalism 
is internally contested (Streeck and Thelen, 2005). Recently, new scholarship in the coordinationist 
camp has acknowledged the existence and even transformational nature of incremental institutional 
change, but continues to insist that the core of the German economy remains fundamentally 
coordinated (Hall, 2007; Carlin and Soskice, 2009; Hassel, 2014; Palier and Thelen, 2010; Thelen, 
2014).  
According to this new argument Germany has not experienced a dismantling but rather a 
shrinking of coordination. This has generated a dual equilibrium with less egalitarian outcomes than in 
the past, but, at least in so far as the manufacturing sector is concerned any notion of liberalization is 
fundamentally misplaced (Hassel, 2014; Thelen, 2014; Palier and Thelen, 2010).  
2.2 The liberalizers  
The liberalizer camp has often set up its arguments in opposition to coordinationist ones. In 
contrast to coordinationists, liberalizers hold that German labour market and industrial relations 
institutions have undergone a wide-ranging process of liberalization, which they see as common to all 
advanced countries (Streeck, 2009; Baccaro and Howell, 2011; Höpner et al., 2011). 
Unions and collective bargaining institutions have become less encompassing (Bosch et al., 
2007: 330-34). Far from shoring up coordinated institutions, employers are seen as actively 
undermining them (Kinderman, 2005; Raess, 2006). Because of companies’ shareholder value 
orientation, it is argued that co-determination has been reengineered to serve the firms’ short-term 
objectives rather than to boost industrial democracy at the workplace (Höpner and Jackson, 2002, p. 
364). Instead of decommodifying labour, collective agreements are now used for bringing wage 
competition within the company’s workforce (Holst, 2014). Wage dispersion has widened and the 
number of low-paid jobs has increased dramatically (Bosch and Weinkopf, 2008). 
According to this literature liberalization is by no means limited to low-end services but is on 
the contrary much more encompassing. The manufacturing sector, it is argued, has experienced 
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growing price-based competition and thinning profit margins (Greer, 2008; Silvia and Schroeder, 
2007). The reasons are seen to reside in the new conditions of international competition in export 
markets. The product quality of German competitors has progressively improved thanks to 
technological progress and organizational learning (Herrigel et al,. 2013). Thus the high-end markets 
of DPQ memory have become more contestable and this has forced German companies to engage in a 
constant process of restructuring which innovates and upgrades while simultaneously cutting costs 
(Herrigel, 2015).  
As labour market regulation weakens and unions’ ability to enforce it declines, employers can 
more easily avoid collective bargaining institutions and employment protection. They use the threat of 
relocation to increase the willingness of works councils to engage in concessions (Jürgens and 
Krzywdzinski, 2006), and increasingly rely on staff agencies and subcontractors (Doellgast and Greer, 
2007; Helfen, 2011). The use of subcontractors is particularly widespread in Germany because it 
strengthens the firms’ ability to react flexibly and rapidly to changes in demand. At the same time, it 
allows for cost savings because subcontracting firms are generally not covered by sectoral agreements 
(Herrigel, 2015).  
Despite their different emphases, the coordinationist and liberalizer camps have moved closer 
to one another in recent years. For example, in Thelen’s important reformulation of the VofC 
argument (2014), the puzzle to explain is no longer ‘varieties of capitalism’ but ‘varieties of 
liberalization’. Thelen’s new argument acknowledges that the German economy is undergoing 
liberalization but explains it as deriving from a ‘natural’ process of deindustrialization, not from firms’ 
strategic decision to disengage from coordinated capitalism. The German economy is seen as being 
composed of two sectors characterized by fundamentally different production logics: the 
manufacturing and the service sector. Coordinated institutions matter for the competitiveness of the 
former, while the latter relies on market-based coordination. Thus, as manufacturing shrinks and the 
service sector expands, the economy as a whole becomes more liberal.   
 Common to both types of arguments is an exclusive focus on the trajectory of supply-side 
institutions (e.g. sectoral bargaining, vocational training, etc.) and a generalized neglect of 
macroeconomic developments.1 Such neglect is unfortunate because, as we argue, changes in 
Germany’s growth model and industrial relations developments ‘co-evolve’ and it is difficult to fully 
understand the latter without grasping the former. In the next section we contend that the German 
growth model has shifted. Household consumption, which was the most important driver of growth 
until the Nineties, has lost importance and exports have dramatically increased their systemic 
relevance.  
3. A Shifting Growth Model? 
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The notion of growth model developed in this paper is inspired by Neo-Kaleckian 
macroeconomics. While space restrictions only allow for a cursory overview (see Omitted Reference 
for a more extensive treatment), suffice it to say that in Neo-Kaleckian macroeconomics output and 
employment are primarily determined by aggregate demand as opposed to supply-side conditions, and 
aggregate demand is, in turn, a function of distribution (Bhaduri and Marglin, 1990; Onaran and 
Galanis, 2012; Storm and Naastepad, 2012; Stockhammer, 2015). This last element is very important 
for the argument of this paper because it establishes a relationship between the social forces and the 
institutions shaping distributive outcomes and macroeconomic dynamics.  
A key tenet of Neo-Kaleckian macro is that due to different propensities to consume and save, 
distributive shifts favouring wages over profits will have an impact on growth. All other things being 
equal an increase in real wages controlling for productivity, which is tantamount to an increase in the 
wage share and a decrease in the profit share, should stimulate consumption.2 However, the total 
impact also depends on the effect on investments and net export.3 Although the analysis is generally 
conducted in terms of shifts in factor shares (wages and profits), it stands to reason that shifts within 
the distribution of wage income, for example redistribution from super-managers to low-wage 
workers, would have similar effects to a redistribution from profits to wages.  
The impact of a unit increase in the wage share on investment is theoretically indeterminate: 
on the one hand, investments tend to be sensitive to profitability rates, and thus should be depressed by 
distributive changes favouring wages (controlling for productivity); on the other hand, they are 
positively related to aggregate demand and are likely to be stimulated if consumption increases. The 
total impact depends on which of the two effects (profitability vs. demand) prevails. The impact on net 
exports is instead more clearly negative. Higher wages controlling for productivity should increase 
imports and reduce exports by leading to an appreciation of the real exchange rate, i.e. by increasing 
domestic prices more than international prices (assuming plausibly that the nominal exchange rate 
does not immediately adjust in the opposite direction to counterbalance the shift). Ultimately, an 
increase in the wage share will stimulate growth if the consumption effect and the demand effect on 
investment are stronger than the negative profitability effect on investment and the negative impact on 
net exports.  
Neo-Kaleckian macroeconomists generally distinguish between two types of growth models: 
wage-led and profit-led depending on the total impact of a unit increase in the wage share. Here we 
take a similar but more limited focus and examine the role of consumption and exports as drivers of 
growth. Consumption-led growth may be fuelled by real wage growth but also by growing household 
indebtedness. In Germany, however, household debt is lower than elsewhere in Europe and has been 
declining over time (Omitted Reference). Export-led growth is a particular type of profit-led growth 
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which emerges when two conditions hold: the export sector is sufficiently large and relative price 
differences are an important determinant of net exports (Omitted Reference). 
The requirements for export-led growth may conflict with consumption-led growth and vice 
versa. If an increase in consumption causes an increase in domestic prices above trade competitors, the 
expansionary impact of a consumption increase may be partially or even totally offset by the 
depressing effect on net exports, especially if exports are a large component of aggregate demand and 
if foreign demand for exports is price sensitive (Bhaduri and Marglin 1990; Bowles and Boyer 1995). 
Similarly, if wage cuts boost price competitiveness, net exports are stimulated but consumption is 
repressed. The total impact on growth depends on the size of the respective effects. A country’s 
growth may in principle be pulled both by consumption and exports if exports are relatively price 
inelastic (Omitted Reference).  
The importance of exports and consumption as drivers of growth depends on their shares of 
GDP. As shown in Figure 1, the share of exports in German GDP has been growing dramatically from 
the early 1990s on from less than 20 percent in volume terms to more than 40 percent in 2008, while 
the household share of GDP, after spiking in the early 1990s as a consequence of German unification, 
has been declining afterwards from 59 to 56 percent. The same figure shows that imports have also 
increased as a percentage of GDP but less than exports thus leading to a growing trade balance 
surplus.  
FIGURE 1 HERE 
Figures 2 reports a simple growth decomposition exercise by calculating the annual growth 
rate of major components of aggregate demand (household consumption, investment, government 
consumption and net exports) weighing each by their share of GDP. This allows us to assess the 
relative importance of each demand component as a driver of growth. Data are organized in five-year 
averages. The growth contribution of private consumption largely exceeded that of any other 
component until the early 1990, with the exception of the recession of the early 1980s. Public 
consumption also played a non-negligible role in 1974-1979. From 1994 on, however, the contribution 
of consumption declined constantly and became a negligible 0.4 percent in 2004-2008, while the 
contribution of net exports increased constantly and reached 0.9 in the same period. The main drivers 
of German growth seem to have changed over time, and although it is difficult to pinpoint a clear date, 
the shift may have taken place in the early 1990s. Also, a trade-off seems to have emerged between net 
exports and domestic consumption. In 2009 there was a dramatic collapse of international trade and 
the German economy rebalanced a bit: the growth contribution of net exports declined and the growth 
contribution of consumption increased a little. However, the adjustment was not large enough to undo 
the previous trends and the trade balance became strongly positive again in more recent years. 
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FIGURE 2 HERE 
One possible explanation for the trade-off between exports and consumption is that exports 
have become more price-sensitive over time. If exports are price-sensitive, expanding exports requires 
repression of wages and consumption to prevent an appreciation of the real effective exchange rate 
(REER). The next section explores the plausibility of this hypothesis.  
 
4. The Price-Elasticity of German Exports 
 
The claim that German exports may have become sensitive to price differences runs counter to 
much received wisdom in comparative political economy. According to both the Streeck and Hall & 
Soskice’s arguments referred above, German firms do not compete on costs; rather, thanks to the 
‘enabling constraints’ of the rigid institutional ecosystem in which they operate, they compete on 
quality (Streeck 1991, 1997a; Hall and Soskice 2001). The implicit assumption of this literature is that 
German exports are not very price sensitive. To our knowledge, this hypothesis has never been tested 
in political economic research. However, it has been tested in trade economics and the econometric 
evidence does not support it. In fact, Stahn (2006) summarizes the findings of studies covering the 
1970s and 1980s as follows: “Most studies find that price competitiveness has a noticeable influence 
on exports, with a coefficient having an absolute value of just below 1.0.” A coefficient of 1 means 
that an increase of 1 percent in domestic prices relative to foreign prices (expressed in domestic 
currency) reduces export growth by 1 percent. Breuer and Klose (2014, 9) have recently estimated 
export equations for a number of European countries for 1995-2012. They have found that German 
exports have a price elasticity of 0.82, which is smaller than France’s but greater than Austria, 
Belgium, the Netherlands, and other countries. The European Commission (2014) has found a price 
elasticity of German export of 0.81 for 1994-2014, slightly higher than the average for the Euro area as 
a whole (0.77). Thus, German exports do not seem particularly price-insensitive in comparative 
perspective.  
The recent literature on the price-elasticity of German exports (whose results are summarized 
in Appendix 1) has the following common features: 1) the basic specification is growth of export 
volumes regressed on foreign demand and relative price differences; 2) the model is estimated in first 
differences if no evidence of cointegration is found or with some variant of the error correction model 
(ECM) otherwise; 3) results tend to vary considerably depending on the indicator of price 
competitiveness used (Bayoumi et al. 2011) and the time period selected. With regard to the post-
unification period, studies whose coverage ends in the early 2000s tend to find smaller or even 
insignificant elasticities (Stahn 2006, Danninger and Joutz 2008), while studies reaching the early 
2010s find greater elasticities suggesting the possibility of growing effects over time (Breuer and 
Klose 2014, European Commission 2014, Thorbecke and Kato 2012).  
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Against this background, a recent study by Storm and Naastepad (2015) is interesting because 
it embraces the classic Varieties of Capitalism argument about the sources of German export success 
and seeks to provide empirical support for it (see also Storm and Naastepad 2012). Storm and 
Naastepad argue forcefully that the recent German export success has nothing to do with any wage or 
cost compression and everything to do with Germany’s superior non-price competitiveness, which in 
turn is determined by the “distinctly non-neoliberal dimensions of Germany’s economic model” 
(Storm and Naastepad 2015, 12). They do not focus on the real exchange rate, but on unit labour costs 
relative to the main trade partners (RULC), and find an insignificant coefficient of RULC using 
quarterly data for 2006-2014. A crucial assumption of this analysis is that the contribution of 
manufacturing unit labour costs (ULC) to export prices is strictly in proportion to the share of unit 
labour costs in total manufacturing costs (25 percent). Based on this assumption, Storm and Naastepad 
divide existing estimates of the impact of relative prices by four (2015, 14). However, ULCs in 
manufacturing may contribute to export price formation both directly and indirectly, i.e. by 
influencing other prices, such as the price of service inputs. This seems especially likely to happen in a 
coordinated wage bargaining system such as Germany’s. The authors seem aware of this problem and 
in fact they argue (2015, ft. 3, p. 14): “When dismissing RULC [relative unit labour costs] as a factor 
determining competitiveness and current account imbalance, we are not implying that the same holds 
true for the (real) exchange rate.” Thorbecke and Kato (2012) come to the opposite conclusion to 
Storm and Naastepad (2015) and argue that Germany’s large internal devaluation is responsible for the 
recent export surge. Their econometric analysis finds that German exports to the Euro area are more 
price-sensitive than exports outside the Eurozone, but also (in partial support of Storm and 
Naastepad’s findings) that real exchange rates based on relative ULCs have lower elasticities than real 
exchange rates based on consumer prices (0.6 vs. 1).  
Overall, it is not possible to come to any definite conclusion about the price sensitivity of 
German exports and whether it has changed over time solely based on the literature. While there is 
consensus that German exports respond negatively to real exchange rate appreciation, the estimated 
magnitudes vary and it is not clear whether price sensitivity has increased or decreased in more recent 
years. Thus, in the remainder of the section we perform our own analysis. Before proceeding further, 
however, it is important to state clearly that the argument about the growingly export-led nature of the 
German growth model does not hinge solely on exports having become more price-sensitive. 
Elasticities need to be evaluated at a particular point of the distribution of independent variables and so 
the size of the export sector matters (see Bhaduri and Marglin 1990, Bowles and Boyer 1995). Since 
the German export sector has expanded dramatically in the past 25 years, even with unchanged price 
elasticities wage restraint (which is recessionary for a wage-led economy) should have a progressively 
more expansionary effect on total demand through the stimulation of net exports, and the stimulation 
of net exports should at some point counterbalance the contraction of consumption demand.  
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In performing our analysis we draw from and extend the work of Stockhammer, Hein and 
Grafl (2011). They provide a detailed econometric assessment of the impact of globalization on the 
German growth model. Using annual data for 1970-2005, Stockhammer and co-authors find that the 
coefficient of the relative price variable almost doubled between 1970-1987 and 1987-2005. However, 
perhaps because of the small number of observations, the difference was not statistically significant.  
As it customary, we model manufacturing export volumes as a linear function of foreign 
demand and price competitiveness. Data on exports are from the AMECO database.4 We also use data 
from the UN COMTRADE database on the largest export sector in Germany: machinery and transport 
equipment.5 Foreign demand is operationalized with world real GDP (excluding Germany) from the 
World Development Indicators database (see Onaran and Galanis 2014, for a similar choice).6 Price 
competitiveness is measured in two ways: as the ratio between export prices and import prices, both 
from the AMECO database (Px/Pm) (as in Stockhammer et al.  2011, Onaran and Galanis 2014), and 
as real effective exchange rates based on unit labour costs in manufacturing from the Fred Database 
(REER/ULC).7 All series are non-stationary in levels and integrated of order 1, i.e. stationary in first 
differences. We find no evidence of cointegration among our variables. Thus, we estimate the models 
in first differences (as in Stockhammer et al. 2011, Onaran and Galanis 2012, Storm and Naastepad 
2015). Logging the variables allows us to interpret the coefficients as elasticities (percentage change). 
For reasons of space, we report here the key steps of the analysis. Details are consigned to the 
footnotes.8  
Table 1 Columns 1 and 2 present two regression models for total exports of goods in 1971-
2014 distinguishing between the two measures of price competitiveness: Px/Pm or REER/ULC. The 
coefficients for relative price growth are always negative and significant and in the same ball park as 
previous estimates. The elasticity is higher when relative price growth is measured with export prices 
relative to import prices than with real effective exchange rates based on manufacturing ULCs. An 
increase of price competitiveness of 1 percent is associated with a decline of export growth of 0.8 for 
Px/Pm and of 0.4 percent for REER/ULC. The models also suggest that each 1 percent increase of 
world GDP growth is associated with an increase of German export growth of about 3 percent on 
average.9       
 
Table 1 Columns 3 to 6 test whether there has been a shift in the price-sensitivity of German 
exports in the post-1990 period by interacting the price variable with a post-1990 dummy. Models 
three and four focus on total manufacturing exports distinguishing between the Px/Pm and 
REER/ULC measures of relative prices, respectively. Models five and six focus on the machinery and 
transport equipment sector distinguishing again between Px/Pm and REER/ULC, respectively. With 
46 percent of total exports of goods on average, this sector (which includes both the auto industry and 
the machine tool industry) is the largest export sector in Germany. There is a significant increase in the 
price elasticity of exports in the machinery and transportation equipment sector in the period post 
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1990: the coefficient of the interaction term is four times larger than the main effect, which is instead 
insignificant. The estimates suggest that a 1 percent increase in the ratio of export to import prices was 
not associated with a significant decrease of exports in the 1970s and 1980s, but in the 1990, 2000s, 
and early 2010s it was associated with a decline of 1.3 percent on average. In the other models the 
interaction term is negatively signed but not significantly different from zero, which suggests that the 
increase in price elasticity is not a general feature of the manufacturing sector but only of its largest 
component.10 Even within the machinery and transportation sector the effect is significant only when 
the Px/Pm measure of relative prices is used but not when the real exchange rate based on unit labour 
costs is used. This suggests that relative unit labour costs are a weaker determinant of export success 
than export prices as a whole.11 
TABLE 1 
To explore the evolution of price elasticity further, Figure 3 displays the results of moving-
window regressions for the machinery and transportation equipment sector. The graphs are based on 
the model in Table 1, which is estimated for shifting 11-year intervals beginning with 1972-1982 and 
ending with 2003-2013. Relative price coefficients and 90 percent confidence interval are plotted over 
time. The graph on the left reports the estimates obtained when using the Px/Pm indicator; the one on 
the right the REER/ULC one. Given the small number of observations the confidence intervals are 
large and often cover zero. However, there is a clear negative trend in both graphs. The price elasticity 
of exports seems to have increased more dramatically when using export prices relative to import 
prices, but also with real exchange rates based on relative unit labour costs.12 
 
FIGURE 3 HERE 
 
Overall, the analysis suggests the following: 1) German exports are price-sensitive: over the 
1971-2014 period a loss of price competitiveness of 1 percent is associated with a decrease of exports 
of 0.8 percent for the manufacturing sector as a whole; 2) exports respond more to movements in 
overall export prices (which are also affected by profit margins, price of intermediate goods, and price 
of service inputs) than to movements in relative unit labour costs in manufacturing; 3) there is 
evidence of an increase in the price elasticity of exports over time in the machinery and transportation 
equipment sector, but not in manufacturing as a whole. In the machinery and transportation equipment 
sector exports were price-insensitive in the 1970s and 1980s (consistent with the DQP and CME 
arguments) but have become increasingly more price-sensitive in the post-1990 period. 
In sum, the analyses in this and the previous section suggest that important changes have 
occurred in Germany’s growth model. Growth used to be pulled primarily by consumption until the 
early 1990s but became almost exclusively export-driven afterwards. In addition, contrary to much 
received wisdom in comparative political economy, German exports are sensitive to relative price 
differences and their price sensitivity seems to have increased in the leading machinery and 
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transportation equipment sector. It needs to be added that the single European currency has probably 
contributed to cement the German export-led growth model by ruling out compensating nominal 
exchange rate devaluations by the main European partners. In the next section we provide an argument 
for both the cause and the effect of export price sensitivity. In the 1990s Germany’s key export 
markets (such as the auto industry) became progressively more competitive because international 
competitors found new and cheaper ways to produce high quality products. Faced with tougher 
competitive conditions, export- oriented firms responded by cutting costs and by relaxing institutional 
rigidities, and this led to a progressive erosion of industrial relations.  
 
1. The Trajectory of German Industrial Relations 
Industrial relations are crucial institutions both for the demand side and the supply side of the 
political economy, and their transformation has played a fundamental role for the changes undergone 
by the German model. On the one hand, industrial relations redistribute income from capital to labour, 
and across skill levels and sectors (Machin, 1997; Wallerstein, 1999; Rueda and Pontusson, 2000). 
Therefore, they play a crucial role in supporting internal demand as wage incomes and middle incomes 
have a higher propensity to consume than capital incomes and high incomes (Klär and Slacalek, 2006, 
Stockhammer et al., 2009). On the other hand, industrial relations also determine the cost of labour, 
affecting the price competitiveness of exports. 
In the traditional German model of textbook fame, i.e. approximately between the 1970s and 
the 1980s (Streeck, 1997a), industry-level bargaining set uniform wage and working conditions not 
only within but also across sectors. Unions in export-oriented sectors (such as IG Metall) negotiated 
wage increases in line with economy-wide productivity gains, which are generally lower than sector-
specific ones, in order to create a common wage floor for unions in less dynamic sectors. This system 
of pattern bargaining redistributed income from workers in more productive sectors and companies to 
workers in less productive ones (Schulten, 2001, p. 5). At company-level, although works councils 
contributed to render the system more flexible (Thelen, 1991), agreements with the works councils 
were subordinated to industry-level agreements (Müller-Jentsch, 1995), and thanks to high 
unionization rates among works councillors (Niedenhoff, 1981, pp. 27-30), unions could prevent the 
diffusion of a company-oriented logic. Works councils enforced the application of sectoral agreements 
to all workers in the firm along the once vertically integrated value chain. Thus, in a manufacturing 
company, workers employed in logistics, catering and cleaning services were covered by the same 
collective agreement as their colleagues in more ‘productive’ business units such as the assembly line 
or forging. 
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In the Eighties, bargaining coverage was around 80 percent (Streeck, 1997b, p. 244) and union 
density in the metal sector was around 40-45 percent, 10 percentage points higher than the overall 
organization rates (Hassel and Schulten, 1998, p. 499). The employers’ association organized firms 
with over 77 percent of the employees (Silvia and Schroeder, 2007, p.1440). The high coverage was 
also due to the relatively frequent declarations of collective agreements as ‘generally binding’. In 
Western Germany between 500 and 600 collective agreements per year were declared generally 
binding in the period 1977-1987, with a peak of 608 in 1980 (BMAS, 2013, p.7). In 1984/5 almost 43 
percent of generally binding agreements covered wage issues (Data by Wonnenberg cit. in Bispinck, 
2012, p. 502).  
The first signs of collective bargaining decentralization emerged in the mid-1980s, when IG 
Metall conceded the introduction of opening clauses about working time flexibility at the workplace in 
exchange for a 35-hour working week (French, 2000, p. 203). While only the Western metal industry 
and the printing industry achieved the goal of 35 hours/week in the Nineties (Hassel and Rehder 2001, 
p. 14), the working-time offensive of IG Metall paved the way for collective bargaining 
decentralization because it institutionalized workplace negotiations.  
The German unification contributed further to this trend even though it was initially decided 
that traditional bargaining institutions would be transferred in block to Eastern Germany to favour the 
convergence of wages and welfare levels. In 1991 unions and employers’ associations in the metal 
sector signed a staged wage agreement (Stufenplan) to achieve wage parity by 1994 (French, 2000, p. 
204). When the Eastern German economy collapsed, however, Gesamtmetall (the metalworker 
employer federation), responding to the pressure of small and medium-size enterprises in Eastern 
Germany, suspended the Stufenplan in 1993 and asked for new negotiations and the introduction of 
opening clauses at company-level. IG Metall was forced to accept opening clauses. These were 
initially placed under the supervision of a commission of employer and union representatives (French, 
2000, pp. 206-208). Still, the agreement implied the progressive institutionalization of exceptions to 
the rigid sectoral bargaining. These exceptions rapidly spread during the employers’ cost offensive of 
the Nineties.  
After unification unemployment ballooned in Eastern Germany. Demand for local products 
declined due to competition from ‘new’ Western products and to price appreciations in the order of 
300 percent after the introduction of the D-Mark. Furthermore, the competitiveness of Eastern firms 
was undermined by rapid wage increases while productivity stagnated (Lindlar and Scheremet, 1998). 
After a short-lived boom, in the early 1990s unemployment started rising in West Germany as well. 
The burden of unification on the public budget did not allow expanding vocational training or using 
early retirement schemes to mitigate job losses (Jürgens, 1997, p. 112). High wages were identified as 
one of the main causes of structural unemployment. It was argued that they impaired the 
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competitiveness of the German production model as the rise of US and Japanese manufacturers 
brought labour-cost competition into high-quality product markets (Herrigel, 1997, p.178-9). In 
addition, high labour costs, especially for low- and middle-skilled workers, prevented employment 
growth in the most labour intensive segments of manufacturing (Sinn, 2006) as well as in private 
services (Scharpf, 1997).  
Faced with a cost problem, the German manufacturing industry engaged in intense 
restructuring since the beginning of the Nineties. Manufacturing companies introduced lean 
production techniques and restructured their value chain into modules carried out by suppliers 
(Jürgens, 2004; Greer, 2008). Furthermore, the new markets in Eastern Europe allowed companies to 
access cheap production sites (Jürgens and Krzywdzinski, 2006). It is true that Kinkel and Maloca 
(2009) also report cases of backshoring after a few years, mainly from Czech Republic, Poland and 
Hungary, but outsourcing does not necessarily require to be actually carried out to achieve 
concessions. If the threat is credible, it alone is sufficient. According to a survey by the Fraunhofer 
Institute, over 40 percent of companies in core manufacturing sectors outsourced part of their 
production abroad between 1999 and 2001, and 75 percent of these companies did so mainly for 
reducing production costs (Kinkel and Lay, 2003, p. 4). Similarly, a survey by the Cologne Institute 
for Business Research reports that around 60 percent of enterprises between 1000 and 5000 employees 
set up new plants outside the old EU member states (cit. in Sinn, 2006, p. 1160). Export companies 
were particularly active in offshoring and the import content of German exports increased from 25 
percent at beginning of the Nineties to 38 percent by 2004 (Ludwig and Brautzsch, 2008, p. 177).  
The massive outsourcing of low-skilled manufacturing jobs and the high unemployment rate 
(around 10-12 percent from the 1990s to mid-2000s) provided the background for a heated debate over 
the future of Germany as production site (Standortdebatte). The Standortdebatte focused on the 
necessity to cut labour costs in order to re-gain competitiveness and to save jobs, contributing to 
building a consensus around the imperative of reforming collective bargaining, labour market and 
welfare institutions (Upchurch, 2000, p.76). In the first half of the Nineties the employers’ associations 
– especially Gesamtmetall – started withdrawing from sectoral bargaining institutions. Following 
Eastern Germany, the pressure for lower wage levels and flexible company-level solutions grew also 
from Western German small and middle-sized companies (Hassel and Rehder, 2001, p. 5). Thus, the 
employers’ associations introduced the option of membership without applying the sectoral agreement 
(OT-Mitgliedschaften), and Gesamtmetall achieved a contested agreement in 1994, which froze wages 
for one year and allowed companies to bargain with works councils over a working time reduction up 
to 30 hours/week in exchange for employment security (Turner, 1998, pp. 104-6).  
Workplace agreements known as Pacts for Employment and Competitiveness (PECs) quickly 
spread across sectors both in Eastern and Western Germany, especially in companies with an 
16 
 
internationalized product strategy. Works councils were made co-responsible for the competitiveness 
of the production site and were put under great pressure for concessions because of the credible threat 
of disinvestment or outsourcing and the high unemployment rates. PECs included concessions 
regarding working time, work reorganization, early retirements and wage cuts or freezes, and could 
amend the sectoral agreements for the first time (Rehder, 2003). Initially legitimated as a response to 
an exceptional economic situation (Hassel and Rehder, 2001), since the end of the Nineties the PECs 
have become an institutionalized tool for co-management, bringing the decentralization of collective 
bargaining a step forward (Rehder, 2003, p.118). While the diffusion of PECs started in the 
manufacturing sector, it also affected the service sector (Seifert and Massa‐Wirth, 2005). In particular, 
research found that PECs were used in the infrastructure industries that had been privatized at the end 
of the Nineties to respond to rising market competition (Rehder, 2003; Doellgast, 2009).   
The unions started worrying that the spreading of formal opening clauses and of informal 
agreements among local-level actors would undercut sectoral agreements. To regain a modicum of 
control over the centrifugal tendencies, especially of large work councils, IG Metall signed the 
Pforzheim Agreement in 2004. The agreement made derogations to collective agreements possible, but 
only if employers offered concrete measures for safeguarding jobs, such as new production 
investments. Also, sectoral unions and employers’ associations were to be actively involved in the 
negotiations (Haipeter, 2009).  
Parallel to these developments at company and sectoral level, there were national-level 
attempts to come up with a negotiated response to high unemployment, but they were unsuccessful. 
The Alliance for Jobs set up in 1995 - a national tripartite bargaining forum - failed because unions 
refused the package of labour market reforms and welfare cuts proposed by the government and 
employer association (Bispinck and Schulten, 2000). The Parliament approved some of the measures 
anyway in September 1996. The duration of temporary employment contracts was extended up to 24 
months and the qualification safeguard clause for the unemployment benefits was lifted, pushing the 
unemployed to accept work at low qualification levels (Eichhorst and Marx, 2011). Three years later 
the second Alliance for Jobs, Training and Competitiveness also failed to agree on a package of 
concrete measures to counter unemployment (Bispinck and Schulten, 2000).  
 Faced with social partner stalemate, the Red-Green government launched a programme of 
unilateral reform. The “Commission for Modern Labour Market Services” – or Hartz Commission 
after the name of his chair Peter Hartz – was in charge of the Agenda 2010, which aimed at decreasing 
the unemployment rate by 50 percent over three years (Menz, 2005, p. 204). The Hartz reforms were 
approved between 2003 and 2005, and had a strong impact both on the welfare system and on the 
labour market. Hartz I deregulated the use of agency contracts by lifting any obligation to specify the 
reason for the fixed-term contract and to hire agency workers permanently after a certain period. 
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Furthermore, collective agreements could amend the equal pay principle set by law (Bundesagentur 
für Arbeit, 2011, p. 5). Hartz II extended the application of lower social security contributions and tax 
rates to marginal part-time jobs up to 800€/month and lifted the limitation of weekly hours; it also 
created subsidies for self-employment (Jacobi and Kluve, 2006). Hartz IV merged unemployment 
benefits and social benefits. The period covered by unemployment benefits was shortened to a 
maximum of 18 months, and the eligibility criteria for unemployment assistance were tightened. 
Furthermore, the criteria defining the acceptability of a job were changed in order to increase the 
pressure on Hartz IV recipients to actively engage in the job search (Hassel and Schiller, 2010, pp. 26-
34). 
The Hartz reforms encouraged unions and works councils in the manufacturing sector to 
bargain around wage flexibility and other internal flexibility measures to increase the prospects for job 
security of core workers (Eichhorst and Marx, 2011). However, they mostly affected the service 
sector, thus deepening the gap between this sector and the manufacturing sector. Indeed, the service 
sector has traditionally been less organized than the manufacturing sector in Germany (Dølvik and 
Waddington, 2002) and had (slightly) lower bargaining coverage rates already in the Nineties, as 
shown in the following section. Furthermore, atypical work, especially marginal part-time jobs, had 
already started spreading in the Nineties, as atypical contracts allowed employers to save on social 
security contributions and on wage costs (Eichhorst and Marx, 2011, p. 21). By further liberalising the 
use of atypical contracts, the Hartz reforms contributed to creating a stable low-wage service sector 
(Palier and Thelen, 2010; Hassel, 2014).  
In sum, the German model of industrial relations has undergone considerable political and 
economic liberalization in the past twenty years, and the manufacturing firms’ efforts to cut costs and 
boost external competitiveness have been at the forefront of the reform process. Liberalization was 
incremental in manufacturing and more radical in the service sector due to traditionally weaker 
institutions and to the Hartz reforms. The next section uses new data on bargaining coverage and on 
differences between insiders and outsiders to illustrate some of the outcomes of the process. 
  
2. The New German Model  
Although the organizational erosion of German class actors has been well documented 
(Hassel, 1999; Bosch et al., 2007), the extent to which sectoral collective bargaining has been eroded 
by the liberalizing trends illustrated above, including in core sectors, is less well-known. Our analysis 
relies on data from the Establishment Panel of the Institute for Employment Research (IAB), which is 
an annual representative employer survey. Table 2 reports data on the coverage rates of sectoral and 
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company-level bargaining measured as percentage both of the workforce and of establishments for the 
manufacturing and the private service sectors.13 Sectoral bargaining coverage is declining steeply in 
both manufacturing and services: the workforce coverage rate was 80.3 percent in manufacturing and 
71.1 percent in services in 1995 and by 2013 it had fallen to 50.4 percent in manufacturing and 45.2 
percent in services. In other words, there has been a loss of 25 to 30 percentage points in 18 years, and 
there are no dramatic differences in coverage between manufacturing and services. The decline was 
not compensated by company-level agreements, whose coverage rates only slightly increased in 
manufacturing while it halved in services. 
Equally if not more worrisome are trends in the sectoral coverage rates of establishments. This 
coverage rate was 63.2 percent in manufacturing and 56.7 percent in services in 1995, and it fell to 
26.9 percent in manufacturing and 32.4 percent in services in 2013. In other words, now the proportion 
of establishments covered by sectoral agreements is greater in services than in manufacturing.   
TABLE 2 HERE 
Furthermore, between 2005 and 2007 (the two years for which data are available) over 20 
percent of the manufacturing establishments covered by sectoral agreements made use of opening 
clauses, which, as argued above, can amend the provisions set by collective agreements. Overall, the 
above evidence suggests that industry-level bargaining is still the main type of bargaining in Germany, 
but is full of holes, since only about 30 percent of German manufacturing establishments is covered by 
a collective contract of any type.  
The softening of industry-level agreement has important consequences for the ability of 
collective bargaining institutions to redistribute productivity growth within and across sectors, thus 
stimulating domestic demand and consumption. This function was key for supporting wage incomes in 
low-end services, but the redistributive function of the traditional pattern bargaining system seems to 
have eroded. Figure 4 is based on data from the EU KLEMS database14 and compares real wage 
growth in high-end manufacturing and low-end private services with economy-wide labour 
productivity in the 1974-to-1990 period.15 The graph shows that wages grew at approximately the 
same rate as productivity in both sectors in this period. However, as reported in Figure 5, the situation 
changed dramatically in 1991 to 2007: only high-end manufacturing was able to keep up with 
economy-wide productivity growth for some time, while service sector wages have been flat and even 
slightly declining in real terms. 
Figure 5 supports the claim about dualization between manufacturing and services (Hassel, 
2014; Thelen, 2014). However, the graph also suggests that even in the privileged manufacturing 
sector wages began to trail productivity from the early 2000s on. Wages, especially in the service 
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sector, have been affected by slack internal demand. Indeed, research has found a vicious circle 
between wage moderation and deficient internal demand. Wage moderation (together with welfare 
reforms) reduces the household disposable income and therefore depresses internal consumption, 
affecting particularly the demand for private services. In turn, stagnant demand has negative effects on 
employment and, ultimately, wages and salaries (Freeman and Schettkat, 2002; Salverda and 
Schettkat, 2005; Herzog-Stein et al., 2013a).  
FIGURES 4, 5 HERE 
An alternative interpretation of the wage trends is that they have little to do with developments 
in collective bargaining and simply reflect the dramatic increase in unemployment. Leaving aside the 
fact that this alternative interpretation would not account for the intersectoral pattern reported in 
Figure 5, Figure 6 reports a Phillips curve relationship between the annual growth of hourly earnings 
and unemployment in 1991-2014. Unsurprisingly, higher unemployment is associated with lower 
wage growth. However, the relationship seems to have shifted downwards in the post-crisis years, 
suggesting that wage moderation has continued even in the more recent years, despite much more 
favourable labour market conditions (see also Dustmann et al., 2014).  
FIGURE 6 HERE 
Overall, the wage trends reported above suggest that intersectoral redistribution and balanced 
wage growth were indeed features of the old German model, but not of the new one. Considering that 
the employment share of high-end manufacturing declined by approximately 30 percent in 35 years, 
while the share of low-end private services increased by 40 percent (based on EU KLEMS data), this 
situation implies that only a shrinking share of workers sees its real wages grow in proportion to 
productivity. As argued in section 3, wage repression depresses domestic consumption and contributes 
to lock-in export-led growth.  
Hassel (2014) has argued that stagnant wages in the service sector have been beneficial for the 
manufacturing sector in two ways: they have contributed to real exchange rate depreciation thus 
favouring export growth, and have boosted the real disposable income of workers in export industries. 
In other words, although export-led growth is based on wage repression, such repression has largely 
spared the manufacturing workers. Based on these distributional patterns, it may be argued that the 
export-led growth model is underwritten by a social coalition of export-oriented firms and core 
manufacturing workers, while service sector workers and atypical workers are the losers (see Hassel, 
2014; Thelen, 2014). However, the stability of this supporting coalition is threatened both by the more 
recent wage trends suggesting that manufacturing wages, too, have begun to trail productivity 
increases on average, and by the increase of atypical work in the coordinated manufacturing core.  
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Data we collected from the German Socio-Economic Panel (1995-2013), reported in Table 3, 
suggest that the ‘standard’ employment relationship has been eroding not just in services but also in 
manufacturing even though the liberalization of the employment relationship still is (and has always 
been) greater in low-end services. Permanent contracts in manufacturing decreased from 87.5 in 1995 
to 78 percent in 2013 while agency work increased from 1.57 percent in 2000 to 5.4 in 2012 and fixed-
term contracts went from 3.83 to 5.97 percent in the same period. The situation improved a bit in 
2013, with a marginal increase in the proportion of regular contracts in manufacturing and a decrease 
of atypical ones, but it is too early to speak of a reversal.    
TABLE 3 HERE 
In addition to the increase of atypical contracts in manufacturing, there is circumstantial 
evidence suggesting that the boundaries between core workers in manufacturing and marginal workers 
in services have become increasingly blurred. In their study on the diffusion of atypical contracts 
across occupations in Germany, Eichhorst et al. (2015) and Marx (2011) have argued that labour 
market segmentation is more nuanced than suggested by the dualisation scenario between stable 
manufacturing workers and precarious service employees because atypical contracts have been 
spreading also in occupations which used to be protected from job instability such as socio-cultural 
professionals and manufacturing workers. Furthermore, recent research found that employers have 
used agency contracts to replace permanent job positions and reduce labour costs since the Hartz 
reforms in 2004 (Promberger, 2012; Garz, 2013; Jahn and Weber, 2013), a line of argument which has 
been embraced by the Federal Government's 10th Report on Agency Work as well (cit. in IG Metall, 
2007). Qualitative studies in automotive and machine tool building corroborate this claim, showing 
that core manufacturing workers and atypical workers often perform similar tasks, even in skilled 
positions (Holst et al., 2010; Omitted reference1). This substitution process was found possible thanks 
to the limited firm-specific content of many job positions; at the same time, in those positions where 
more specific skills were required, managers were able to employ atypical workers for longer periods 
of time as these workers hoped to be hired on a permanent contract at the end of their “temporary” 
assignment (Omitted reference1).   
As a result of these trends, the core manufacturing workforce and their representatives have 
started feeling that atypical work is a way to replace their jobs with more precarious and less costly 
ones (Eichhorst and Marx 2011; Omitted reference2). While manufacturing unions have tried, on the 
one hand, to increase the costs of atypical work (especially agency work) through sectoral collective 
agreements (Omitted reference2), they have also been found to use wage moderation as an instrument 
for strengthening the competitiveness of core manufacturing workers against atypical workers 
(Eichhorst and Marx 2011).  
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To sum up, while the evidence so far has supported the idea that export-led growth has 
affected the manufacturing and service sector in asymmetric ways, it has also shown that there hardly 
is an institutional equilibrium between the two labour market segments. The erosion of industrial 
relations institutions has advanced, slowly but steadily, also in the manufacturing sector, and wage 
moderation has affected the sector too in the last fifteen years. Atypical contracts have increased in 
manufacturing as well, and evidence based on secondary literature suggests that they have started 
replacing permanent positions and undermining the bargaining power of core workers. 
 
 
3. Concluding Remarks 
This article has sought to explain the institutional trajectory of German industrial relations in 
the last 20 years by focusing on the interaction between shifts in the growth model and meso- and 
micro-level restructuring and reform initiatives. The argument has proceeded in three steps. First, we 
have argued that Germany has moved from a growth model in which GDP growth was primarily 
pulled by household consumption to a model in which exports are the main growth engine. We have 
presented evidence suggesting that exports have become more price-sensitive than they had previously 
been in a large and important portion of the manufacturing sector. This points to the exhaustion of the 
DQP model of specialization in price-inelastic markets and suggests the emergence of a trade-off 
between exports and domestic household consumption: growth of the latter negatively affects the 
former through the real effective exchange rate. The implication is straightforward: to the extent that 
exports are the sole source of growth, growing the economy requires cutting domestic costs.  
Second, through an historical reconstruction we have illustrated how the impetus to cut costs, 
particularly in export-oriented manufacturing firms, largely explains the trajectory of German 
industrial relations in the 1990s and 2000s. German firms have reacted to the need to regain 
competitiveness in various ways: they have reorganized industrial production in global supply chains 
and outsourced industrial services; they have reconfigured existing industrial relations institutions 
through, e.g., employers leaving employer organizations in order not to be forced to apply the 
negotiated terms, the widespread diffusion of derogatory plant level bargaining, and the threat of 
outsourcing and offshoring. In the 1990s there were also repeated attempts to address problems at the 
national level through European-style social pacts, but they failed. This pushed the government to 
engage in unilateral liberalization of the labour market, particularly of agency work and 
unemployment insurance. By increasing the fear of job losses, these legislative changes have further 
encouraged worker concessions (Eichhorst and Marx, 2011; Rebien and Kettner, 2011). 
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Third, we have provided an analysis of the current features of the German industrial relations 
system. Only half of the workforce in the manufacturing sector, and slightly more than one fourth of 
establishments, are still covered by the sectoral collective agreement, and one fifth of the 
establishments applying the sectoral agreement make use of opening clauses. The severe erosion of the 
collective bargaining system has impaired the ability of pattern bargaining to transfer productivity 
increases into wage increases and to redistribute between sectors. In the 1974-1990 period, high-end 
manufacturing and low-end service wages grew more or less at the same rate, but in the 1991-2007 
period only manufacturing wages were able to keep up with general productivity growth (with 
increasing difficulty from the early 2000s on), while service wages were flat. While core 
manufacturing workers largely managed to shift wage repression onto the peripheral service workers, 
the notion that the former are protected from liberalization finds no support in our data. We have 
shown that atypical contracts have been increasing in core manufacturing sectors too, a trend which 
has been found to trigger downward competition between insiders and outsiders (Eichhorst and Marx 
2011). The argument developed here shares some features with the recent ‘coordinationist’ argument 
about dualization as it acknowledges that wage repression in the service sector has contributed to 
maintaining the costs of export production low (Herzog-Stein et al., 2013b). However, our argument 
emphasizes very different causal mechanisms and leads to different conclusions about the stability of 
the system. For example, while Thelen’s recent argument claims that liberalization happens by ‘drift’ 
as deindustrialization advances and the size of the manufacturing sector shrinks (Thelen, 2014), our 
argument suggests that the impetus for change comes from the export sector itself, and specifically 
from the firms’ cost-cutting imperative. As Germany becomes increasingly dependent on exports, the 
value for workers of holding a good job in the export-sector increases relative to the alternatives, and 
so does their willingness to make concessions. This situation is likely to contribute to further collective 
bargaining erosion. 
We would argue that the analysis of the ‘co-evolution’ between changing macroeconomic 
conditions and institutional dynamics has also allowed us to better specify the mechanisms of 
liberalization. Because of its exclusive focus on supply-side conditions, which it shares with the other 
camp, the ‘liberalizer’ literature (our own work included) has so far (in our view) failed to provide a 
fully convincing account of where the impetus to liberalize comes from, assuming that capital always 
liberalizes when it has its way. The analysis developed here suggests that the reasons are more 
specific. In the past, the growth model had allowed for a certain amount of ‘slack’. With price-
insensitive exports in a large chunk of manufacturing there was no trade-off between consumption and 
exports. In fact, institutional rigidities such as high wages and generous protections were even 
dynamically efficient to the extent that they encouraged industrial upgrading as argued by the DQP 
literature. But with exports becoming more price-sensitive, the slack turned into ‘ballast’ and firms 
started throwing it overboard (with a helping hand from government).  
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Our argument also implies that growth models are produced by a complex pattern of 
interaction between domestic and international factors and the conditions for their reproduction are not 
entirely at the disposal of national-level actors. Already more German cars are produced outside of 
Germany than inside (Deutsche Bank Research, 2011). Nobody can exclude that production phases 
which are currently carried out on German soil could one day be efficiently performed elsewhere at a 
lower cost. Equilibrium-based analyses ignore these developments at their peril. They suggest that still 
more ballast may have to be shed. 
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Figure 1: Private consumption, exports, and imports as percentage of GDP (constant prices) 
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Data are symmetric five-year moving averages (i.e. 1980 is the average of 1978 through 1982) 
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Figure 2: Contribution of demand components (private consumption, investment, government 
consumption, net exports) to GDP growth: 1974-2013 (5-year averages)  
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Figure 1: Price Elasticity of Exports from Moving-Window Regressions: Machinery and Transportation 
Equipment 
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The graphs are based on the model in Table 2 and plot coefficients and confidence intervals for 11-
year moving window regressions. The years on the x axis correspond to the last year of the interval. 
For example, 1982 is the coefficient of a regression estimated on data between 1972 and 1982. 
36 
 
Figure 2: Trends in real wages (high-end manufacturing and low-end services) and labour productivity 
(total economy) in 1974-1990  
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Source: own elaborations on EU KLEMS data (for the definition of sectors see text) 
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Figure 3: Trends in real wages (high-end manufacturing and low-end services) and labour productivity 
(total economy) in 1991-2007 
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Source: own elaborations on EU KLEMS data (for the definition of sectors see text) 
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Figure 4: Relationship between nominal earnings and unemployment in Germany 
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Table 1: Determinants of Manufacturing Export Growth (volume) with Period Specific Price Elasticities 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Sector Total Total Total Total Machines & 
Transp 
Machines & 
Transp 
Relative price indicator Px/Pm REER/ULC Px/Pm REER/ULC Px/Pm REER/ULC 
       
World GDP growth 2.796*** 3.075*** 2.859*** 3.105*** 2.357*** 2.677*** 
 (0.404) (0.451) (0.450) (0.528) (0.630) (0.631) 
Relative price growth -
0.855*** 
-0.402*** -
0.800*** 
-0.327 -0.310 -0.368 
 (0.188) (0.148) (0.212) (0.212) (0.299) (0.258) 
Relative price x post-
1990 
  -0.256 -0.137 -1.392** -0.471 
   (0.471) (0.337) (0.662) (0.408) 
Post 1990   1.616 1.238 1.460 0.842 
   (1.197) (1.402) (1.702) (1.718) 
Constant -
3.782*** 
-4.785*** -
4.839*** 
-5.580** -3.107 -4.161 
 (1.366) (1.527) (1.785) (2.072) (2.493) (2.489) 
       
Observations 44 44 44 44 42 42 
r2_a 0.645 0.547 0.647 0.537 0.452 0.471 
Durbin autocorrelation 
test 
n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s. 
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Table 2: Bargaining coverage in core manufacturing sectors and low-end service sectors (1995-2013) 
 
Sectoral agreements in 
manufacturing 
Sectoral agreements in 
services 
Company-level agreementsa 
in manufacturing 
Company-level agreements in 
services 
Year %establishment %workforce %establishment %workforce %establishment %workforce %establishment %workforce 
1995 63.2 80.3 56.7 71.1 5.5 8.1 8.3 9.4 
1996b 55.4 74.9 46.3 65.4 10.9 11 11.7 10.3 
1997 59.2 73 47.6 65 11.3 12.5 9.1 10.3 
1998c 53 70.7 44.9 62.5 5.8 7.3 4.2 6.5 
1999 47.6 65.3 41.9 61.1 3.4 7.8 2.4 5.5 
2000 43 63.5 46.5 60.8 3.1 6.7 2.4 4.8 
2001 42.1 62.6 44.3 60.6 4.8 9.4 2.4 5.1 
2002 41.9 63.9 42.7 58.7 2.8 8.4 2.1 5.3 
2003 44.5 63.2 41.2 58 3.3 8.9 2.3 5.7 
2004 40.9 62.5 38.6 55.2 2.6 7.4 2.1 5.4 
2005 36.9 58.1 37.4 53.6 2.7 9.3 2 4.8 
2006 36.7 55.3 36.6 52.3 2.7 10.8 2.1 5.2 
2007 34.7 55 35.8 49.2 3.6 10.1 2-4 5.1 
2008 32.2 54.6 36.3 49.6 3.6 10 2 4.4 
2009 33.7 53.2 37.1 50.1 3.6 10.4 2.5 4.5 
2010 29.8 51.6 35.6 50.3 2.9 11.3 1.7 4.1 
2011 28.3 50.5 33.7 46.7 2.8 10.2 1.6 4.3 
2012 29.3 49.9 34.3 46.9 2.6 10.1 1.7 4.6 
2013 26.9 50.4 32.4 45.2 3 12.1 1.3 4.4 
Source: own elaboration on IAB establishment panel  
a These agreements (Haustarifverträge) are signed instead of sectoral collective agreements. These are therefore 
different from opening clauses, which are company-level agreements amending the terms of the sectoral 
agreement applied in the company and are discussed separately in this section. 
b The comparability between 1995 and 1996 is affected by the inclusion of establishments from the new Federal 
States in the panel.  
c  The gap in the rates of company-level agreements between 1997 and 1998 is likely to be due to a change of the 
survey question.  
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Table 3: Comparison of rates of permanent and contingent work in manufacturing and low-end services 
(1995-2013) 
Source: own elaboration on SOEP data 
a The drop in the rate of self-reported marginal contracts (and increase in part-time job) is probably due 
to a change in the questionnaire. 
b, d The increase of self-reported marginal contracts is probably due to changes in the regulation of 
minijobs. 
c The increase of temporary contracts in 2008 might be due to new hirings on fixed-term contracts 
because of the economic uncertainty during the crisis. 
 % permanent  % part-time  % marginal  % fixed-term  % agency  
Year Man Ser Man Ser Man Ser Man Ser Man Serv 
1995 87.5 63.94 6.02 23.83 2.66 7.40 3.83 4.84 n.a. n.a. 
 1996a 87.44 62.15 5.92 23.80 2.58 7.59 4.07 6.47 n.a. n.a. 
1997 87.97 59.78 5.61 27.99 1.89 6.21 4.52 6.02 n.a. n.a. 
1998 87.46 58.39 5.68 28.09 1.80 7.87 5.06 5.65 n.a. n.a. 
1999b 86.96 59.44 5.02 23.55 2.43 10.46 5.59 6.56 n.a. n.a. 
2000 85.24 57.66 6.22 23.12 2.82 11.43 5.71 7.78 n.a. n.a. 
2001 85.13 59.29 6.60 23.72 2.00 10.85 4.70 5.68 1.57 0.45 
2002 83.55 56.42 7.86 25.59 2.83 11.87 4.38 5.30 1.37 0.82 
2003 84.61 55.69 6.57 26.31 3.00 11.05 3.86 5.24 1.96 1.71 
2004 83.56 54.49 6.92 24.97 3.34 12.10 4.23 5.92 1.94 2.52 
2005 83.28 53.95 7.11 23.76 2.65 14.70 3.84 4.84 3.12 2.75 
2006 81.41 52.80 7.26 23.08 3.42 15.11 3.66 7.36 4.25 1.65 
2007 80.96 53.54 7.82 23.57 3.56 13.69 4.73 7.03 2.93 2.18 
2008 78.16 54.33 8.71 22.04 3.66 15.67 6.71c 6.63 2.77 1.33 
2009 81.43 53.32 7.56 23.40 4.50 15.77 4.50 5.81 2.91 1.70 
2010 81.91 53.44 7.74 21.64 3.99 16.20 3.99 6.96 2.98 1.77 
2011 77.67 51.23 8.93 21.99 5.54 17.13 5.54 7.76 4.35 1.89 
2012 77.36 51.65 7.95 23.85 5.97 13.57 5.97 9.36 5.40 1.57 
2013 78.73 48.06 10.01 23.30 4.52 20.26d 4.52 7.34 3.28 1.04 
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Appendix 1: Empirical Studies on the Price Elasticity of German Exports 
Article  Data Time period Estimator Coefficient 
Measure of relative 
prices 
Stahn (2006)  
(Table 1) 
Quarterl
y 
1980q1-
2004q3 ECM 
-0.92/-0.58  
(Euro area) REER/total sales 
Stahn (2006)  
(Table 1) 
Quarterl
y 
1993q1-
2004q3 ECM 
insignificant  
(Euro area) REER/total sales 
Danninger and Joutz 2008  
(p. 704-5) 
Quarterl
y 
1993q1-
2005q4 VECM -0.42/-0.14 REER/ULC 
Stockhammer et al. 2011  
(Table 4.1) Annual 1970-2005 First Differences -0.78 Px/Pm 
Stockhammer et al. 2011  
(Table 4.1) Annual 1970-1987 First Differences -0.67 Px/Pm 
Stockhammer et al. 2011  
(Table 4.1) Annual 1987-2005 First Differences -1.24 Px/Pm 
Onaran and Galanis (2012)  
(Table 8a) Annual 1971-2007 First Differences -0.43 Px/Pm 
Storm and Naastepad 2012  
(Table 5.4) Annual  1960-2000 First Differences -0.12 RULC 
Thorbecke-Kato 2012 
(Table 2a) 
Quarterl
y 
1980q2-
2011q1 Dynamic OLS -1 REER/CPI 
Thorbecke-Kato 2012 
(Table 2b) 
Quarterl
y 
1980q2-
2009q3 Dynamic OLS -0.64 REER/ULC 
Breuer-Klose 2014  
(Table 1) 
Quarterl
y 
1995q1-
2012q2 SURE ECM -0.82 REER/ULC 
European Commission 
2014  
(p. 32) 
Quarterl
y 
1994q1-
2014q1 
fractional 
VECM -0.81 REER/export prices 
Storm and Naastepad 2015  
(Table 1) 
Quarterl
y 
1996q2-
2008q4 First Differences 
Insignifican
t RULC 
ECM=Error Correction Model; VECM=Vector Error Correction Model; OLS=Ordinary Least Squares; 
SURE=Seemingly Unrelated Regression; REER/total sales=real effective exchange rate based on deflators of 
total sales; REER/ULC=real effective exchange rate based on consumer price indexes; Px/Pm=export price 
deflator/import price deflator; REER/CPI=real effective exchange rate based on consumer price indexes; 
RULC=relative unit labor costs  
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Endnotes 
 
1 One exception is Carlin and Soskice (2009), which focuses on the German unemployment crisis of the early 
2000s and explains it as resulting from weak aggregate demand. By emphasizing that a restrictive 
macroeconomic ‘demand regime’ is functional for export competitiveness and that saving propensities have 
increased in Germany as a result of macroeconomic uncertainty, their argument has some elements in common 
with the one we develop in this paper. 
2 For recent empirical evidence suggesting that consumption out of profit income is significantly lower than 
consumption out of wage income see Hartwig (2014: 425-6). 
3 Note that the discussion treats government expenditures as exogenous. 
4 http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/ameco/index_en.htm, accessed on January 10, 2016. 
5 http://wits.worldbank.org/default.aspx, , accessed on October 23, 2014. 
6 http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators, accessed March 1, 2016. 
7 https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/, accessed September16, 2015. 
8 For stationarity we perform the ADF test with various combinations of trend, constant and lag order. For 
cointegration we run both an Engle-Granger cointegration test and a Johansen cointegration test (trace test and 
maximum eigenvalue test). These tests are available upon request. 
9 The negative intercepts indicate a negative time trend controlling for other determinants. This is probably a 
result of the entry of new competitors over time. The autocorrelation tests at the bottom of the table suggest that 
first order serial correlation is not an issue.  
10 We also estimated regressions for the other largest sectors: exports of chemical and related products 
(representing on average 14 percent of total exports of goods), manufactured goods classified chiefly by material 
(e.g, leather, textile, etc.) (17 percent), and miscellaneous manufactured articles (10 percent). In these regression 
the main effect was negative and significant with the Px/Pm indicator of relative prices, and there was no 
evidence of a significant coefficient change in the post-1990 period. There seems to be sectoral heterogeneity in 
the price sensitivity of exports which should be explored in future research. 
11 The positive sign of the period dummy suggests that export growth is greater in the post-1990 period, although 
the dummy is never significant. 
12 The models after 1997 include a dummy for 2008. The year 2008, the first year of the global crisis, is 
characterized by a decline of export growth in machinery and transportation equipment not adequately captured 
by a decline in world growth and with an increase in price competitiveness. It is therefore an outlier. Qualitative 
findings are similar if regressions are estimated without the dummy.   
13 The following manufacturing industries are included: Pulp, paper, paper printing and publishing; chemical, 
rubber, plastics and fuel; other non-metallic mineral; basic metals and fabricated metal; machinery, NEC; 
electrical and optical equipment; transport equipment; manufacturing NEC; recycling, food processing; textile; ; 
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services includes retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles; repair of household goods ; hotels and 
restaurants;  and the category ‘other personal services’. 
14 See http://www.euklems.net/ (March 2008 release). 
15 High-end manufacturing includes NACE codes D21 through D37: paper and pulp, petroleum products, 
chemicals, rubber and plastics, non-metallic mineral products, metal products, machinery, electrical and optical 
equipment, transportation equipment and manufacturing NEC; low-end services includes retail trade (NACE 
code G52) and hotels and restaurants (H).  
